Freedom House’s Freedom In The World Report 2024 is now available. For countries covered in the report, each receives a) an overall score and classification as Not Free, Partially Free, or Completely Free; b) a score in two main categories – political rights and civil liberties; and c) scores in seven subcategories- electoral process, political pluralism and participation, functioning of government, freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights. These subcategories have additional categories for which countries receive a score as well.
With recent concerns about the state of democracy in the region, what signals can stakeholders pick from the report? In examining the latest scores, I also looked at what the reports have shown over the last decade to see what significant changes – positive or negative- have occurred over the period.
Before delving into West-Africa, the report noted this about freedom globally – “Political rights and civil liberties were diminished in 52 countries, while only 21 countries made improvements. Flawed elections and armed conflict contributed to the decline, endangering freedom, and causing severe human suffering.”
Worrying Signs
Of the fifteen countries in West-Africa, a) Two (Ghana and Carbo Verde) are Completely Free; b) Ten (Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Togo) are Partially Free; and c) Three (Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali) are Not Free.
A decade ago, the picture looked different – a) Four countries (Benin, Carbo Verde, Ghana, and Senegal) were Completely Free; b) Nine (Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo) were Partially Free; and c) Two (Guinea Bissau and The Gambia) were Not Free.
The freedom situation is more concerning because of deteriorations in specific countries – a) Benin (completely free to partially free); b) Burkina Faso (partially free to not free); c) Guinea (partially free to not free); and d) Senegal (completely free to partially free).
The freedom scores are another area of concern. The average freedom score in West-Africa dropped from fifty-six points (56) a decade ago to fifty-one points (51) currently. The variation across countries in the subregion is quite instructive and stark – a) among the two countries classified as completely free, the average freedom score is eighty-six (86) points; b) among the ten classified as partially free, the average freedom score is fifty-one (51) points; and c) among the three classified as not free, the average freedom score is twenty-eight (28) points.
All the seven subcategories follow the same pattern of significant differences depending on the country’s freedom classification. The point here is that when it comes to freedom (political rights and civil liberties) the extent to which a citizen enjoys them fully depends on the country in which they live.
Further probing of the average scores across the subcategories shows the following as the areas where there is a “chipping away” at the freedoms citizens enjoy- a) electoral process; b) political pluralism and participation; c) functioning of government; and d) associational and organizational rights.
I mentioned previously that each of the seven main categories have additional subcategories. Again, a similar comparison shows these as areas of concerns – a) the impartial implementation by the election management body of the electoral laws and framework; b) the freeness of the system from undue obstacles to people who want to organize other political parties or competitive political groupings; c) a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections; d) the extent to which all groups, have full political rights and electoral opportunities; e) the extent to which safeguards against corruption and strong and effective; and f) freedom for nongovernmental organizations with an emphasis on those who work on human rights issues.
Whichever way the report is examined and compared to trends over the last decade, it is safe to say that all is not well in West-Africa.
The Way Forward
In its Vision 2050, the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) has made this commitment – “A fully integrated community of peoples, living in a peaceful and prosperous region, with strong institutions and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, striving for inclusive and sustainable development.”
In furtherance of this vision, under Pillar II (Governance and Rule of Law) ECOWAS commits to a) strengthening democratic governance; b) consolidating the rule of law and justice delivery; and c) promoting the respect for fundamental rights and freedoms.
Political freedoms and civil liberties are key anchors of a well-functioning democracy. And Ecowas’ commitment to Pilar II comes at a critical juncture for West-Africa. As Ghana’s President Akufo-Addo said on September 29, 2023, “democracy in West Africa is in danger.”
The danger does not have to be a permanent and I believe a dedicated implementation of Pillar II will reverse it.